Brazil has made major strides towards equality among races, yet large disparities remain. This article examines the history of racial inequality since independence (1822), a period encompassing the abolition of slavery (1888). The social construction of race and its historiography are examined, and trends in the relative outcomes -including life expectancy, literacy, primary school completion, income, and occupation -of Afro-Brazilian, white, Asian, and Indigenous people are identified. There has been major progress in terms of literacy, education, health and employment-opportunity since the end of slavery, but there were reversals along the way. Improved racial equality along these dimensions did not, unfortunately, directly translate into equality of income. Only in the past decade has the black-white income gap fallen below its 1960 level, although preliminary figures for the late 19 th and early 20 th century suggest it is at its lowest point ever. Many scholars have investigated race in Brazil, yet time-series on racial outcomes have typically not extended beyond the term of a few decades.
I. Introduction
There is a broad effort to reduce racial inequality in Brazil and, over the past decade-ortwo, it appears to have been successful. Affirmative action was introduced under the Secretary of State for Human Rights in 2002, for example, and a new Secretary of Policy for the Promotion of Racial Equality was established in 2003. Disparities between races -formally defined as black (preto), white (branco), mixed-race (pardo), Asian (amarelo), and Indigenous (indígena) -have declined in terms of literacy (Paixão et al., 2010) , level-of-schooling (Marteleto, 2012) , and employment and earnings (ILO, 2007) . Is this recent experience part of a larger trend?
This work considers the history of racial inequality in Brazil from independence (1822) to present. It addresses the social construction of race, which originates with slavery itself, and reviews the associated literature, dating to the late nineteenth century. The relative well-being of Afro-Brazilians (pardos or pretos) and whites is described across major historical periods -the Imperial Era (1822-1889), First Republic (1889 -1930 ), Vargas Era (1930 -1945 , Second Republic (1946 -1964 ), Military Rule (1964 -1985 , and Return to Democracy (1985 to present) -and new time-series are presented for all races on life expectancy, literacy, primary school completion, average years of schooling, average monthly income, and occupation by sector.
The racial makeup of Brazil, according to national census data from 1872 to 2010, is illustrated in Figure I . Race was not recorded in the 1920 census, but between 1890 and 1940 there is a clear increase in the share of the population considered white, and decrease in the proportion of pardos (literally 'browns'); the black population is about constant in relative terms.
After 1940, when the percentage share of the white population peaked, the Asian/Indigenous minority becomes visible and the representation of black and mixed-race individuals grows: the Afro-Brazilian population is a majority as of 2010, as it was during the 19 th century. Consider the cumulative number of slaves imported up until each period and, separately, the cumulative number of immigrant arrivals (Table I) : the size of the 'flow' versus the 'stock' gives a crude sense of the fate of each group.
An estimated 5.5 million African slaves were shipped to Brazil (4.9 million disembarked) over three centuries of the international trade, relatively close to the population of 5.8 million "blacks" in 1872. This situation could correspond to zero natural increase; however, ample evidence of positive increase among the free black population during the 18 th century suggests an offsetting negative growth among slaves. The white population increased six-fold between 1820
and 1890, to six million, yet fewer than two million immigrants had arrived until that time. The flow of immigrants only reached the volume of the slave trade in 1950, at which point the white population numbered over 32 million. In contrast to the diverse experiences of the colonial period, racial groups became noticeably more equal during the past two centuries. There was a (cyclical) rise in literacy and education; convergence of income; and decline in occupational segregation between races, at least since abolition. Blacks and pardos (Afro-Brazilians) share a similar trend relative to whites, but the comparative experience of Indigenous and Asian people is more variable. Race is an important aspect of inequality and, although the literature is large, there is a dearth of research which describes long-run trends in relative well-being, especially at the national level.
II. Conceptualizations of Race
A "race" is defined as a group of people with a common ancestry, or sharing certain physical markers such as skin tone, hair texture, facial features, etc. Such traits may not necessarily be indicative of one's genetic origins, though, particularly within the demographic milieu that is the New World. Regardless, there is no biological basis for classifying humans into racial groups, and the (untestable) postulate must therefore be accepted that no so-called race is inherently inferior to another.
If race is an arbitrary concept, why is it so powerful in explaining relative outcomes?
Race -"a socially constructed mode of human categorization," (Loury, 2002; p. 5 ) -is imbued with meaning upon which individuals act, for which very reason it retains its currency. If a group is stereotyped as being inexperienced, for instance, people within this group may receive fewer job offers and, indeed, come to have less experience. In this section, I describe the origins of 'race', the changing social meanings which have been attributed to groups in Brazil, and the historiography of race in Brazil from the early twentieth century to present.
Prior to the 15 th century, when slave production was introduced on the Atlantic islands and the 'New World' was revealed to Europeans, the nature of slavery was quite different: one's status as a slave was less-directly related to his race or ethnicity, and slaves had a greater possibility of someday integrating into society as freemen (Klein, 2010) . In the colonies of the Americas, the scale and harshness of slavery were unprecedented: over 10 million African slaves survived the middle passage over the course of the traffic (Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database), many of whom spent the remainder of their lives producing sugar, coffee, cotton, and other commodities. The system required justification, an underlying ideology which could ensure its continuation amidst acute inequality, hence the invention of race.
The differential status of Europeans, Natives or "Indians," and Africans in the New
World was institutionalized by both church and state. The legacy of 15 th -century Inquisition thinking was that Indians possessed as soul whereas Africans did not; in response to the rapid decline of Native populations during colonization, the Spanish and Portuguese crowns prohibited their (unjust) enslavement in the 1540s. The result was an increasing reliance on African slaves:
in Brazil, the workforce on coastal plantations came to be predominantly African by the beginning of the following century (Klein and Luna, 2010) .
The Portuguese who settled colonial Brazil were predominantly men (as were two thirds of African slaves), and had children of mixed Indigenous, African, and European ancestry.
According to Ribeiro (1995) , the children of Europeans and Indians (mamelucos or mestiços),
and Africans (mulattos) were prototypical of a new unified people: Brazilians. The importance of racial markers, however, indicates a lesser degree of assimilation than Ribeiro implies; nonetheless, race is a qualitatively different concept in Brazil than in other countries.
Gilberto Freyre (Casa-Grande e Senzala, 1933) emphasized the tradition of miscegenation established by the Portuguese as opposed to the antagonisms of Anglo-Saxon colonization -the idea that Brazil is a "racial democracy" is commonly attributed to Freyre and this work (Cardoso, 2013) . Roger Bastide and Florestan Fernandes (1959) counterpoised the notion of 'racial democracy' -that racial relations were fluid -in demonstrating the extent of racial prejudice and barriers to social mobility for people of African descent in urban São Paulo. Fernandes (1965) documents the relegation of blacks and mulattos to low-status occupations and the prevailing anomie among these communities -all of which he interprets as a historical legacy of slavery.
The current classifications of race in Brazil can be traced to at least the eighteenth century: In 1776, Portugal issued a circular which ordered a census to include counts by age and sex; although not required, some governors decided to collect racial information as well (Alden, 1963 Scholars have generally considered racial disparities in terms of a white/non-white or white/brown/black categorization, but its validity has been questioned by Harris et al. (1993) and, recently, Silva and Leão (2012) : the former study involves an experiment which indicates a substantially different racial distribution depending on whether the official term (parda) or vernacular term (morena) is used to refer to the mixed-race population; the latter cites wide variation in the size of the black population depending on how it is defined, as well as a differing perception of race and discrimination amongst pardos. These results are consistent with Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz (2013) , who show that alternative combinations of racial sub-categories could result in Brazil having either a white or black majority.
The potential drawbacks of the current configuration have not been overlooked, however.
In the 1976 household survey, individuals were asked both an open-ended question on race and one with the four standard options (branca, parda, preta, or amarela) : just six racial categoriesincluding branca, parda, and preta, as well as morena, morena-clara, and clara -encompassed 94% of respondents (Wood and Carvalho, 1994) . Although morena was as common a response in the open question as was parda in the structured one (34% of respondents in each instance), its usage is perhaps too general to function as a census category (Telles, 1995) .
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Racial identity may be fungible, but the schemas employed in Brazil nonetheless correspond to real social divisions, shaped by ancestry as well as class: the progressive 'whitening' of the population was a result of racial mixing and the higher fertility/lower mortality of whites, not only the implicit incentive for pretos and pardos to self-select as pardos and brancos (Ribeiro, 1995 The royal court relocated to Rio de Janeiro upon Napoleon's 1807 invasion of Portugal;
João VI became king in 1816, returned to Portugal in 1821, and the ensuing year his son Pedro I declared Brazil independent and himself emperor (Merrick and Graham, 1979) . Pedro I abdicated in 1831 and was succeeded by Pedro II, only five years old, who was crowned in 1840
and served until the republican coup of 1889. While there was much continuity with the colonial era, this period spanned the unprecedented expansion of the southeast slave economy, suspension of the international slave trade in 1850, and ultimate abolition of slavery in 1888.
Coffee -whose cultivation was introduced into São Paulo during the mid-1700s and spread to Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, and Minas Gerais (Filho, 1952 ) -surpassed sugar as
Brazil's most-valuable export by the 1830s (Bethell and Carvalho, 1989 (Klein, 1971) ; substantial numbers also migrated to the southeast from the interior states of Mato Grosso, Goiás, and Minas Gerais.
For coffee producers, investment in slaves yielded above-average rates of return around 12 to 15% (de Mello, 1977) . Figure the value of coffee produced per slave is based on Soares (1860), Taunay (1939), and Conrad (1972) . For comparison, the estimated annual earnings of immigrant families on coffee plantations, according to Dean (1976) , are also shown. Sources: Mean monthly nominal slave hire rates from Carvalho de Mello (1977) . Value of coffee produced per worker based on 25 60-kg sacks. For 1825-1849, output figures from Ferreira Soares (1860) and price data from Taunay (1939) ; for 1850 to 1888, output and prices are from Conrad (1972) .
In 1870, for example, the value of coffee output per worker was $552,025 réis, compared to a mean annual slave hire rate of $322,800 ($26,900/mo.) and estimated wages per immigrant family of $301,950. The immigrant family wages, with two working adults, and slave hire rates are not very different, but the family could potentially double its income by selling subsistence crops or animals and was provided with housing: the immigrant family money wage is therefore a good proxy for the earnings of an adult.
To quantify the relative standard-of-living of slaves, I consider the fraction of earnings which they would receive in goods and services (e.g. clothing, food, and medical care) versus the wages of free workers. The "in-kind wage rate" corresponds to the difference between the gross and net hire rates, or the cost of slave maintenance as estimated by de Mello (1977) . In Figure   III , the daily hire rate (received by the slave owner) is shown against the value of goods and services consumed by a slave (the slave 'wage'), half the daily earnings of an immigrant family (colono), and the going wage rate for a day laborer (camarada) from 1870 to abolition. Sources: Slave hire rates and in-kind slave receipts (cost of slave maintenance) are from de Mello (1977) ; Colono wages, including and excluding crops, and day-laborer (camarada) wages are from Dean (1976) , except for 1884, 1886, and 1888 observations which are from Hall (1969) ; daily earnings based on 52 6-day workweeks.
The individual daily colono money wage (calculated as one-half of the family wage) is relatively close to the average value of goods and services received by slaves per day. Including proceeds from the sale of subsistence crops estimated by Dean (1976) , the colono daily wage approximates the daily slave hire rate. Both, however, are below the going rate paid to day laborers. This does not imply that camaradas were better off: on the contrary, their employment was relatively infrequent and annual wages were probably at or below those of colono families.
In 1886, slaves received in-kind just 35% of the daily wage of a free laborer.
Slaves were not just producing coffee but employed in every conceivable occupation, from gang laborers on the plantations, to shipbuilders and urban merchants (Klein and Luna, 2010) . In relative terms, however, they formed less than half of the black-and-mulatto population. 2 The free Afro-Brazilian population was a growing majority: circa 1825, 62.5% of the population was black-or-mulatto but 'only' one-third (33.2%) was enslaved; circa 1850, 60.6% of the population was of African descent with one-quarter (24.7%) enslaved; and in 1872, 58.0% was black or mulatto and less than one-sixth (15.2%) slave (Bucciferro, 2013) .
The numbers of free Afro-Brazilians, as well as their diverse employments and those of slaves, give the impression that discrimination was relatively subdued (e.g. Klein and Luna, 2004) . Flory (1977) considers the ambiguous nature of race after independence: free and slave blacks were often treated indifferently by contemporary legislation -vagrancy laws did not explicitly mention race, for instance (but were selectively enforced) -and the citizenship of free native-born blacks was recognized by the 1824 constitution. Periodicals catering to mulattos were founded in the 1830s, but race was more-frequently referred to within the context of politics rather than discrimination.
The topic of race was nominally taken up in the press and public discourse, but deeper issues were at stake which could not be articulated. As Pierson (1942) has implied, social mobility existed for people of mixed descent -the 'mulatto escape hatch' referred to by Degler (1971) -yet it was limited and beyond the reach of the third of the population who were slaves.
Brazil was already an outlier in the international context: the Haitian revolution (1794) and cessation of the north-Atlantic slave trade (1807) were decades-passed.
In spite of gestures that it would end the international trade, it was condoned until 1850 when the British intervened and escorted intercepted slaves back to Africa (Bethell, 1970) . The newly-inelastic supply of labor prompted panic. The basis for continued economic growth was connecting labor with abundant land on the frontier, and this was at-risk; although there were many native Brazilians, they were overwhelmingly in the subsistence sector and withdrawn from the money economy (Furtado, 2006 (Furtado, [1959 ). Cognizant of the potential end to slavery, planters began to experiment with European immigrant labor.
The movement towards abolition accelerated after 1850: in 1871, the Law of the Free Womb declared the children of slave mothers free upon maturity and gave slaves the right to purchase their own freedom; the Sexagenarian Law followed in 1885, which freed slaves over 60 years of age; and the Golden Law ended slavery altogether in 1888 (Andrews, 1991) . Even though the princess-regent signed the law, it was not a political victory: active rebellion by slaves had made abolition imminent and the monarchy was overthrown the following year.
ii.) First Republic (1889 Republic ( -1930 Freedom brought its challenges to former slaves in Brazil. In the southeast, discrimination by employers and ex-slaves' demands for independence led to the latter's substitution by European immigrants. In other regions, after the immediate upheaval of abolition, life resumed a pattern similar to the previous regime. There was noticeable variation, however, in the adaptation of workers to the new situation. Abolition was a mixed blessing in that it awarded slaves freedom but not necessarily a material improvement in quality-of-life.
Racism, prevalent at the end of the 19 th century, contributed to employers' preference for workers from Europe but cannot fully explain it. If there were large numbers of freed slaves (libertos) and other Brazilians (trabalhadores nacionais) available, why were planters determined to hire European immigrants? On one side, whites blamed Afro-Brazilians for the disruptions in the labor force associated with abolition (Ianni, 1962) ; on the other, freed slaves only desired to return to the plantation on certain terms, and not the money wage per-se.
The conditions under which ex-slaves would transform into wage laborers were very limited, Furtado postulates (2006 Furtado postulates ( [1959 ): if freed slaves were given a 'subsistence' salary the old system would remain fundamentally unchanged, but if there were abundant unoccupied lands they would prefer to engage in subsistence agriculture. In Brazil, he explains, the northeast sugar zone was already fully-settled and bound by the caatinga (scrublands) to the west, under which circumstances the labor of former slaves could be secured at a relatively low wage; in the southeast coffee zone, in contrast, lands were abundant and wages relatively high.
Free blacks wanted to distance themselves from the plantation because physical work was culturally considered demeaning and associated with slaves (Ianni, 1962) . Afro-Brazilian families withdrew women and children from the fields, and occasionally the workforce entirely; immigrant families, in contrast, supplied female and child labor in order to make ends meet, an attractive feature for employers (Andrews, 1991) .
The solution to the labor-scarcity problem was consequently to flood the market with immigrants and thereby drive down wages. Beginning in 1881, programs were created in collaboration with the São Paulo provincial government to subsidize the transportation of migrants from Europe to Brazil. The Society for the Promotion of Immigration was created in 1886 and worked with the province until its dissolution in 1895 (when the government assumed this function), having facilitated the immigration of nearly 220,000 people (Hall, 1969) .
The immigration program was successful: Compared to 195,000 immigrants who arrived in Brazil between 1870 and 1889, immigration between 1890 and 1909 totaled 1,100,000, half of whom (515,000) were Italian (Kodama, 2007) . In the 1890s, about as many immigrants entered São Paulo as there were slaves in all of Brazil the year before abolition. 3 This situation was made possible by "push" conditions in the Old World: according to Furtado (2006 Furtado ( [1959 ), the unification of Italy exposed the less-developed south to competition with the north, which hurt southern manufacturers and created a "permanent situation of depression," (p. 187).
Northern Europe, the United States, and Argentina were among the potential destinations for Italian emigrants; because of the significantly higher wages in the U.S. and Argentina, Brazil was only an attractive option for those who could not afford passage (Williamson, 1995; Hatton and Williamson, 1998) . Furthermore, contemporary reports publicized that the situation of European immigrants in Brazil was not unlike that of slaves. 4 Those who chose to go there were often desperate, which is exactly what planters wanted. 3 The overall slave population of Brazil in 1887 was 723,419 (Reis, 2007; from Conrad, 1972) ; between 1890 and 1899, 734,985 immigrants entered São Paulo (Kodama, 2007; from Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros, 1973) . 4 In 1888, for instance, the Italian Geographical Society asserted that the São Paulo immigration program served "to substitute white slaves for black ones," and documented a series of abuses (in Hall, 1969; p. 122) .
Many labor arrangements existed on the fazendas (plantations), but immigrants to São
Paulo commonly became colonos; other salaried positions were camaradas and empreiteiros.
The colonos, named for the groups of homes they inhabited among the groves, received a fixed monetary income for maintaining a certain number of coffee trees plus a variable payment depending on the volume of the harvest (Furtado, 2006 (Furtado, [1959 ).
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The camaradas, who commonly resided on the plantation in dormitories (usually remodeled slave quarters), were individual laborers paid daily or monthly (Stein, 1957; Monsma, 2006) . Finally, empreiteiros (or, more precisely, gangs of laborers working under an empreiteiro, or contractor) travelled from plantation to plantation completing jobs at a flat rate (Stein, 1957) . Hall (1969) and Dean (1976) report the carpa (hoeing per 1,000 trees) and harvest payment rates for colonos in São Paulo state for the period from 1884 to 1914 and 1886 to 1915 , 5 Hall (1969 describes the wages on São Paulo coffee plantations: in 1884, the fixed payment (carpa) was about $50 réis per 1,000 trees plus $500 réis per 50 liters of coffee; in 1895, it was $90 and $600 réis; in 1904, $60 and $450 réis; and in 1914, $80 and $400 réis, respectively. After adjusting for the price level (using the cost of rice as a proxy), he concludes that real wages declined by more than 50% between 1884 and 1914. respectively. I use these rates and information on the average number of trees tended and harvest per worker from other sources to estimate annual colono family wages. Coffee output was measured in 60-kilogram sacks or arrobas (1 arroba = 14.4 kg). Based on the figures shown in Table II , each worker tended an average of about 3,000 trees and produced 1,500 kilograms of coffee per year, the equivalent of 25 sacks or 100 arrobas. Sources: Annual wage rates for four-person family based on harvest and hoeing rates reported by Hall (1969) and Dean (1976) , 3,000 trees tended and 120 bushels (50L) of coffee produced per person. Price index (1890 = 100) is from Eulália Lobo et al. (in Leff, 1982) .
The harvest payments were based on capacity in 50-liter bushels, however, and not weight. I translate the annual output per worker from liters into kilograms based on a substance density of 250 kg/m 3 (the substance density of fresh coffee is about 500 kg/m 3 but coffee cherries are much less dense than de-pulped beans). By this calculation, 50 liters of berries would weigh 12.5 kilograms, slightly above the 8.5 kilograms indicated by records of the Santa Gertrude plantation (Dean, 1976) . At this rate, each worker would be paid for an average of 120 50-liter bushels of coffee, plus the fee for hoeing 3,000 trees. Figure IV presents the estimated annual wages of an average colono family between 1884 and 1915 according to these parameters and the harvest and carpa payments compiled by Hall (1969) and Dean (1976) .
Wages were favorable for immigrant families in the years around abolition, declined in real terms from 1892-1894, and then spiked in 1895 when the value of output per worker reached an all-time-high above $2,000,000 réis. After 1900, the increasing price level and stagnant payment rates prompted hundreds of thousands to return-migrate: between 1900 and 1910, there were a total of only 50,000 net immigrants to São Paulo (Hall, 1969) .
In the rest of Brazil, there was no subsidized immigration program and the post-abolition experience of Afro-Brazilians varied. Hasenbalg (1978) writes, "In the Northeast, abolition occurred without great readjustment, and the ex-slaves were incorporated into the various fractions of the northeastern peasantry," (p. 153). Domingues (2008a) summarizes three recent works describing the situation of blacks outside São Paulo: In Sergipe, the elite adopted a series of vagrancy laws whose purpose was to force the free population back onto the sugar plantations (Subrinho, 2000) . In Bahia, freed slaves wanted to limit their labor in the sugar industry as much as possible, and dedicate more time to subsistence farming (Filho, 2006) . In Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, some libertos stayed with their former employers while others migrated to the city in search of work (Guimarães, 2006) .
In Vassouras (northeast São Paulo State), blacks refused to work under conditions associated with slavery. According to Stein (1957) , former slaves faced less competition with immigrants because the latter were drawn to the more-profitable plantations to the west; black and mulatto women resigned from field and domestic labor after abolition, but many eventually returned at a piecemeal rate; likewise with men, who were pressured back onto the plantations (by vagrancy laws, for example) and took up positions as camaradas or colonos not altogether different from their previous occupations.
In the city of São Paulo, blacks in many occupations (e.g. artisans, small merchants) were substituted by foreigners; new arrivals found only inconstant and menial work (Fernandes, 1965;  in Hasenbalg, 1978) . The majority of the urban industrial workforce was comprised of immigrants; while this may owe to their relative mobility, they regularly hailed from rural areas and had no more experience than national workers (Leff, 1982) . Indeed, there is no firm evidence that immigrants were better workers than blacks in terms of education or skills (Andrews, 1991) . Labor organizers promoted racial solidarity, but blacks were reluctant to join the movement because of their effective exclusion from industrial jobs (Andrews, 1988) .
Knowledge of racial inequality during the early twentieth century is limited because there was only one national census (in 1920) and it omitted any consideration of race. A new source of data on occupational segregation in São Paulo, however, reveals widespread inequality of employment: incident reports (Boletins de Ocorrências) collected over the period from 1912 to 1920 included both information on race and occupation and suggest the wholesale exclusion of blacks from certain jobs. By combining the incident report statistics, published in Jacino (2012), with salary data for São Paulo from the 1920 industrial census I can calculate the extent of wage inequality caused simply by (discriminatory) occupational segregation.
In Table III Of course, discrimination within each occupation could realistically more-than-double the size of the wage gap. According to Domingues (2003) , a woman advertised her domestic service in the black journal O Alfinete in 1921 at a rate of $60,000 to $80,000 réis per month (thought 'exorbitant'). This amount corresponds to $2,000 to $2,667 réis per day, below the $2,640 earned by the average female domestic and far short of the $3,750 ($112,500/year) earned by a national worker. It follows that a black employee may have earned somewhere from 50 to 75% of a national one within the same industry.
In some aspects, abolition brought more equality among races -now citizens, former slaves could choose where to live and work; in others, it brought less -libertos were often relegated to inferior employments than previously held. In much of the country, repression and a lack of options for blacks impeded broader changes in social organization, with the exception of the southeast where massive immigration operated to undercut wages and push blacks into the subsistence sector or insecure urban employment. Nationalist sentiment after the Revolution of 1930, however, concurred with the opening of new opportunities for Afro-Brazilians.
iii.) Vargas Era/Second Republic (1930 Republic ( -1964 During the First Republic, institutions of black civil participation were fomenting.
Numerous societies (beginning with Clube 28 de Setembro in 1897) and periodicals (starting with A Pátria in 1899) were established to discuss issues pertinent to Afro-Brazilians (Domingues, 2007) . This culminated in the early 1930s, when black organizations mobilized support and garnered political influence. The black movement would produce tangible benefits for workers, but fail to breach higher-level political constraints.
Getúlio Vargas overthrew the republican government in 1930 with the support of landowners in his home state of Rio Grande do Sul, as well as Minas Gerais and the northeast (Andrews, 1991) . Afro-Brazilians, who had suffered under the Republic, initially supported Vargas; in turn, he helped integrate them into politics and the economy. The Ministry of Labor was established and the Law of Nationalization of Labor passed in 1931, which required that at least two-thirds of the industrial workforce be native-Brazilian (Andrews, 1991) .
The Brazilian Black Front (FNB) was established in 1931 and by 1936 it had thousands of members and 60 delegates in other states (Domingues, 2008b) . The organization supported Vargas (and was an instrument of the repression which ensued), explains Domingues, because like him it championed Brazilian nationalism. The FNB promoted the well-being of blacks, even established an elementary school and health clinic, but became increasingly affiliated with fascism and fractions developed among its members. Disillusionment with the Estado Novo (New State) lessened the imperative for political organization, but the following period was nonetheless one of notable economic progress for blacks (Andrews, 1991) . In spite of some advancement, the situation of blacks and mulattos was markedly different from that of whites and had not changed substantially from the previous decade. For instance, the literacy rate of whites was 46.9% in 1940 and 52.7% in 1950, versus 22.6% in 1940 and 25.7% in 1950 for non-whites (Hasenbalg, 1978 ) -a slightly higher rate of increase for blacks, but unimpressive given their low starting point. In São Paulo, however, while there was a large difference in the relative employment of blacks-and-mulattos compared to whites (24.3 against 20.5%), the rate of growth of industrial employment among Afro-Brazilians was notably higher (Hasenbalg and Salazar, 1994) .
iv.) Military Rule/Return to Democracy (1964 to present)
The military coup of 1964 marked the beginning of the dissolution of progressive AfroBrazilian societies (Domingues, 2007) . As stated by Lovell (1999) : "Military leaders quickly denounced any criticism of racial democracy as an 'act of subversion' and brutally silenced all opposition movements through imprisonment, censorship, and decree," (p. 400). The race/color question was removed from the 1970 census; partial information is available from other sources for 1976, but statistics on racial inequality are generally unavailable until 1980.
In the 1976 National Household Survey (PNAD), whites earned on-average 2.8 times more than blacks (3,433 Cr$ to 1,210 Cr$), and 2.0 times more than people of mixed-race (3,433
Cr$ to 1,722 Cr$); Silva (1985) estimates that 32.9% of the difference between white and mixedrace individuals is attributable to discrimination, and 26.3% of that between blacks and whites.
During the 1980s, Brazil did not have an official policy of segregation, but in many areas one infact existed: Among those companies using staffing agencies in São Paulo, according to reports, the majority would not consider black applicants for white-collar jobs; many retail and office employers would likewise screen out Afro-Brazilians (Andrews, 1991) .
There continued to be journalistic and cultural contributions from Afro-Brazilians during the military government, but not of an overt political nature; only in 1978 did black civil society reemerge in the public sphere, with the foundation of the Movimento Negro Unificado (MNU) or Unified Black Movement (Domingues, 2007) . From the 1980s forward, efforts to eliminate racial discrimination grew and with them, public awareness of and scholarship on race. The new generation of Afro-Brazilian organizers, inspired by pan-Africanism and the U.S. black power movement, emerged with a more-militant orientation after two decades of suppression by the dictatorship (Andrews, 1992) .
Many improvements in the social status of Afro-Brazilians followed: the MNU adopted the term "negro" for both blacks and mulattos, and it lost the negative connotation it had during the First Republic; the holiday commemorating abolition was moved from the 13 th of May to November 20 th , and the 13 th was named the National Day for the Denunciation of Slavery; school curricula were revised, recognizing multiculturalism and the historical role of blacks; and African cultural heritage was generally asserted (Domingues, 2007) .
In the political spectrum, the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PDMB)
held majority control of the government after 1982 and created a state agency, the Conselho de Participação e Desenvolvimento da Comunidade Negra, directed towards protecting the rights of the black community (Andrews, 1992) . 1960, 1980, 1991, 2000, and 2010 censuses (the 1970 census omitted race). For the occupational distribution, I rely on these and alternative sources for periods prior to 1940.
i.) Life Expectancy
Available statistics on life expectancy at birth for whites (brancos) and non-whites (pardos and pretos), and the difference between them, are presented in Table IV . The white/nonwhite dichotomy is shown here because it was standard in the sources where these figures were published; hereafter, each race is presented separately (even though pardos and pretos are found to be similar in many respects). Table IV . Life Expectancy at Birth (Years) by Race, 1950 Race, -2008 Source: data from the 1950 and 1980 censuses, as presented in Wood, Alberto, and Carvalho (1988), and Lovell (1999) (n=34,796,665); in 1950, 57% (43,573,517); in 1960, 40% (3,001,439); in 1980, 26% (5,870,467); in 1991, 23% (8,522,740); in 2000, 15% (10,136,022); and in 2010, 12% (9,693,058) . 1940 , 1950 . IBGE census microdata 1960 , 1980 , 1991 , 2000 , 2010 There was a noticeable decline in the illiteracy of all groups through this timeframe.
Moreover, there is general convergence: illiteracy rates ranged from 81% for blacks (for Indigenous, unknown) to 40% for Asians in 1940, compared to 29% for Indigenous peoples and just 8% for whites in 2010. It accelerated after 1980 -there was an impressive drop in the Indigenous illiteracy rate during the 1990s -although the final decade is interesting because illiteracy amongst Asians increased, presumably a result of changing global migration patterns.
iii.) Education
There are various measures of educational completion but the one which is comparable across the twentieth century, and particularly meaningful in terms of individual capabilities and public policy, is primary school completion. Figure VI presents 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1991 2000 2010 Sources: Recenseamento Geral do Brasil 1940 , 1950 . IBGE census microdata 1960 , 1980 , 1991 , 2000 , 2010 For reference years prior to 1940, the completion rates published in Musacchio et al. (2014) are shown, corresponding to those of the 56-60 year-old cohort in the 1960 census. The completion rates are consistent with overall census figures for later decades (adults may become literate over time, but it is less likely that they return to complete primary school). Figure VI illustrates a clear upward trend in completion of basic schooling over the century. The decline during the 1950s appears strange, yet in a way is consonant with previous results: the absolute change in life expectancy, literacy, and education were all proportionally greater for whites than non-whites. The opposite came to be true in subsequent decades, and a smooth convergence occurred after 1980, with the Indigenous experience of the 2000s being the sole outlier.
I present data for whites and non-whites in Table V In 1976, whites had on-average 1.8 years more schooling than non-whites, according to Table V , and 1.5 extra years a decade later; by 1998, however, the achievement gap was higher than before, and in 2008 at the same level as in 1976. This pattern is somewhat congruous with
Figure VI -education is increasing for all groups in reversing magnitudes -but there was greater educational equality in primary school attainment opposed to average years of schooling, likely explained by proportionally higher secondary and tertiary completion among whites.
iv.) Income Lifespan, literacy, and education -human capital in general -affect one's income.
Given the disparity in each of these areas, racial inequality must also be salient in terms of earnings. I consider reported income by race using the census micro-data from 1960 to 2010, and construct a corresponding time-series of real income ( Figure VII) . The individuals' nominal incomes are adjusted for inflation using price levels from the IBGE National System of Consumer Price Indices, correcting for the five currency devaluations during this era. IBGE census microdata 1960 IBGE census microdata , 1980 IBGE census microdata , 1991 IBGE census microdata , 2000 IBGE census microdata , 2010 Allen (2005) and interpolate the corresponding price levels. I then convert the nominal incomes into a common currency using the cumulative devaluation and re-adjust the figures based on the ratio of the price level in that year to the 2010 price level.
The average real income and number of individuals reporting (in parentheses) in each year are as follows : in 1960, $111 (2,073,823); in 1980, $236 (4,335,331); in 1991, $430 (6,429,425); in 2000, $645 (8,097,077); and in 2010, $749 ( 8,183,198) . Figure In Figure VIII , the ratio of white mean income (the highest in 2010) to every other race's is displayed. The path of relative income after 1960 is not encouraging: income inequality across races decreased in some instances and increased in others, but the trend is essentially flat.
Inequality between whites, Afro-Brazilians, and Asians was range-bound during the 1980s and 1990s, and comparative Indigenous incomes were notably low in 1991. The white-Indigenous and white-Asian income ratios rose between 2000 and 2010, but the main development is the fall in income inequality between whites and Afro-Brazilians, the two predominant groups in Brazil. As LAESER (2010) confirms, the multiples of average percapita white to non-white household earnings for 1988, 1998, and 2008 were 2.31, 2.40, and 1.98, respectively.
The conjectured trend of white-to-Afro-Brazilian income from the slave era to 1960 is also shown. In the preceding analysis, I calculated the slave 'wage' -in terms of goods and services consumed -as a fraction of a free worker's income: the average white worker could earn 2.89 times more than a black or mulatto. I also examined the occupational distribution by race in São Paulo in 1920 which, complemented by advertisements in the black press from Domingues (2003) , suggests that whites may have earned 2.43 times more than blacks or pardos.
The income gap, while large, appears to have just reached its smallest point ever, having eclipsed the 1960 level based on developments during the past ten years.
V. Conclusion
Racial inequality has been getting a lot of attention lately, and for good reason: disparities between white, black, mixed-race, Indigenous, and Asian individuals are large and persistent.
Whether the recent progress in health, education, income, and social inclusion will continue is uncertain, but to see the future it is helpful to look to the past. Scholars have produced much research on race in Brazil, but using disparate methods from which it is difficult to derive broad conclusions. Neither statistics nor micro-histories are sufficient to understand the contours of racial inequality in the long run, but when looked at together there are some interesting patterns.
The 'Imperial Era' (1822-1889) was characterized by the rapid expansion of the southern coffee zone, peak in the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, abolitionist movement, and end of slavery and, with it, empire. The period was also one of relatively informal racial relationships given the Afro-Brazilian majority, over half of whom were free (conditions for slaves varied in urban and rural settings). Life under the First Republic (1889-1930) was perhaps a disappointment for exslaves: in the south, the new bargaining power of libertos was undercut by hundreds of thousands of European immigrants; in other regions, freed slaves settled back into agricultural life or sought poorly-remunerated employment in cities.
The Vargas Era (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) ) brought a meaningful improvement in the status of blacks, opening up industrial positions from which they had previously been excluded. This was shortlived, with repression of black organizations during the Estado Novo, followed by the economic expansion of the Second Republic (1946 -1964 ), and paralysis under Military Rule (1964 -1985 .
The past few decades have been a period of gains for Afro-Brazilians, and race has become imbued with pride, but progress in the areas of higher education and economic mobility has been mixed. The magnitude of racial disparities will undoubtedly continue to cycle, and more knowledge of the nineteenth century is needed, but the general trajectory is positive.
